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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a secure mobile edge computing (MEC) network in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers, where multiple users can offload parts of their tasks to the computational access
point (CAP). The multiple eavesdroppers may overhear the confidential task offloading, which leads to
information leakage. In order to address this issue, we present the minimization problem of the secrecy
outage probability (SOP), by jointly taking into account the constraints from the latency and energy
consumption. With the aim to improve the system secrecy performance, we then introduce three user
selection criteria to choose the best user among multiple ones. Specifically, criterion I maximizes the
locally computational capacity, while criterion II and III maximize the secrecy capacity and data rate
of main links, respectively. For these criteria, we further analyze the system secrecy performance by
deriving analytical and asymptotic expressions for the SOP, from which we can conclude important
insights for the system design. Finally, simulation and analytical results are provided to verify the
proposed analysis. The results show that the three criteria can efficiently safeguard the MEC networks,
compared to the traditional local computing and fully offloading, especially with a large value of user
number.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The development and deployment of the fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks and the
roadmap towards the sixth-generation (6G) have enabled the research community to investigate
new methods for high-speed data rate, ultra-low latency and ubiquitous access, in order to launch
intelligent applications, such as autonomous driving and smart healthcare [1]–[4]. One major
characteristic of these new applications is the need for intensive computation, which clearly
shows the evolution from traditional communication-oriented to computation-oriented systems.
In the computational-oriented systems, the performance metrics of interest have extended from
those related to traditional communication quality, such as the data rate and bit error rate, to
latency, energy consumption, etc [5], [6]. To support these new applications with the need of
intensive computation load, one solution is to compute the tasks in the cloud server, which
however, imposes a huge burden on the communication and may cause a large latency and
energy consumption. To alleviate this, mobile edge computing (MEC) has been proposed, which
exploits the computational capability of near-by devices through offloading some parts of the
users’ tasks [7]–[9]. It has been widely shown in the literature that MEC can reduce the system
latency and energy consumption, and so, it can be efficiently used to support applications of 5G
and 6G networks [10]–[13].
A. Literature
In MEC networks, offloading is a key method to improve the system performance, by reducing
the latency and energy consumption. The offloading policy determines how many parts of tasks
will be computed by the computational access points (CAPs) [14]–[18]. In this direction, the
authors in [19] investigated a joint offloading and computing optimization for MEC networks,
where an optimal resource allocation scheme was developed to minimize the energy consumption
at the CAP. Specifically, for the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled MEC networks, partial
or binary computation offloading mode can be used to maximize the computation rate [20].
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Later, the system computation efficiency of the wireless-powered MEC networks was effectively
enhanced by jointly devising the offloading strategy and the local computing frequency [21].
Furthermore, the impact of energy and task causality on the MEC networks was investigated,
where task offloading and local computing along with the energy beamforming were jointly
optimized to minimize the system energy consumption [22]. Finally, the authors in [23] pro-
posed an offloading strategy for MEC networks with multiple CAPs, where both selection and
switch-and-stay combining protocols were employed to reduce the system latency and energy
consumption.
Due to the nature of broadcasting, wireless offloading may be overheard by eavesdroppers
in MEC networks. This leads to information leakage, and thus, it is of vital importance to
safeguard the wireless offloading process from the physical to application layers. Compared
with the encryption based secure methods, a physical-layer based security method has lower
complexity and attracts increasing attention from the researchers [24]. Physical-layer security of
wireless transmission can be improved by exploiting the system resources, such as signal, user
and relays. In this direction, the authors in [2], [25] developed a secure transmission scheme,
based on the signal constellation overlapping, where an experimental platform was implemented
to secure the transmission over a two-way untrusted relaying system. For relaying networks
with multiple antennas, the system secrecy data rate can be maximized by using beamforming,
which exploits the signal fluctuation among multiple antennas [26]. Moreover, relaying or user
selection could be applied to wireless communication systems with multiple relays or users,
where the channel fluctuation among them was exploited to improve the secrecy data rate and
secrecy outage probability (SOP) [27], [28]. Furthermore, for the cache-aided relaying networks,
the system secure transmission could be secured by exploiting the caching resources, where
several caching strategies were investigated for the secure transmission through providing the
asymptotic SOP expressions in the high regime of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and main-to-
eavesdropper ratio (MER) [29]. Besides the eavesdropping mode in the above works, some other
attack modes such as jamming and spoofing were investigated in [30]–[32], where intelligent
learning based algorithms such as Q-learning algorithm were employed to prevent the intelligent
attackers. Although the existing works have extensively studied the physical-layer security of
wireless transmission, there has been little work on the secure transmission of MEC networks,
which motivates the work in this paper.
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B. Contribution
In this paper, we study a secure MEC network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where
multiple users can offload some parts of task to the CAP. The task offloading may be overheard
by the multiple eavesdroppers in the network, which causes the severe issue of information
leakage. We start with the critical question: “How to optimize the secrecy outage probability
in the secure MEC networks?”. To answer this question, we firstly present the minimization
problem of the secrecy outage probability (SOP), by jointly taking into account the constraints
from the latency and energy consumption. In order to improve the network secrecy performance,
we then employ three user selection criteria to choose one best user among multiple ones to
be assisted by the CAP. Specifically, criterion I maximizes the locally computational capacity,
while criterion II and III maximize the secrecy capacity and data rate of main links, respectively.
We proceed with the following important question: “What is the effect of the system parameters
on the secure MEC networks design?”. To tackle this problem, we study the system secrecy
performance of the secure MEC networks, by deriving analytical and asymptotic expressions
for the SOP of the three user selection criteria. We further analyze how the system SOP is
related to the network parameters, from which we obtain important insights for the system
design. Simulations and numerical results are finally presented to verify the proposed analysis.
In particular, the simulation results show that the three criteria can efficiently safeguard the MEC
networks, compared to the traditional local computing and fully offloading, especially with a
large value of user number.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We investigate a secure MEC network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, and present
the SOP minimization problem by jointly taking into account the constraints from the latency
and energy consumption.
• To improve the system secrecy performance, we provide three user selection criteria to
choose the best user among multiple ones, based on the computational capability and channel
parameters, respectively.
• For the three user selection criteria, we analyze the system secrecy performance by deriving
analytical SOP expressions, in order to evaluate the impact of network parameters on the
secrecy performance in the entire MER regime.









Fig. 1. Secure MEC networks in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
• For the three criteria, we also derive asymptotic SOP expressions in the high MER regime, to
determine the key factors, that govern the network secrecy performance. From the asymptotic
expressions, we can find that the three criteria can efficiently safeguard the MEC networks,
compared to the traditional local computing and fully offloading, especially with a large
value of user number.
C. Structure
The organization of this paper is as follows. After the introduction, Section II describes the
system model of the secure MEC networks, while Section III presents the SOP minimization
problem and provides three user selection criteria for the considered secure MEC networks. In
further, Section IV provides an analysis for the SOP, by deriving analytical and asymptotic ex-
pressions. Finally, Section V presents numerical and simulation results and Section VI concludes
this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 presents the system model of the MEC network under Rayleigh fading, with N users
{Sn|1 ≤ n ≤ N} and one CAP, where the users have some confidential tasks to be computed with
the help of the CAP. This system can be applied to a single-cell network, or multi-cell network
with cell planning or Gaussian distributed interference. The users have limited computational
capability, denoted by the local CPU-cycle frequency set {gn|1 ≤ n ≤ N}. Moreover, gn may
vary in practice, due to many factors such as the dynamic tasks and processes in the user terminal.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that gn follows the uniform distribution [14]–[16], within
the interval of [gmin, gmax]1. To alleviate the computational burden at users, the CAP with a
much more powerful computational capability can help users compute the tasks, through the
wireless transmission from the users to the CAP, subject to Rayleigh fading. As the existing M
eavesdroppers in the network can overhear the transmission of the confidential task, the severe
issue of information leakage may be caused. All nodes in the network have a single antenna due
to the size limitation, and the links in the network experience Rayleigh fading2, without loss of
generality.
Besides the single-cell network, the considered system model can be applied to the multi-
cell network, in the following several folds. Firstly, the considered system model in this paper is
applicable to the multi-cell network with cell planning, where different cells use some orthogonal
frequency spectrums, and the network degenerates into multiple single-cell networks. Secondly,
the considered system model in this paper is still applicable for the multi-cell network with reuse
of frequency spectrums, as the interference among cells can be suppressed by some methods such
as beamforming, and the residual interference can be modeled by the Gaussian noise, through
some design techniques such as random pilot design [33], which can be found in the 4G LTE
and 5G new radio networks. Thirdly, even for the multi-cell network with interference which
may not be modeled by the Gaussian noise, the work in this paper is still meaningful, as it can
provide an important reference for the system design.
All the N users can simultaneously communicate with the CAP, or one user is selected to
communicate with the CAP. As the former mode may cause interference among users and asks
for a very complicated receiver structure at the CAP, the user selection technique is adopted in
this work, in which one user is selected among N to communicate with the CAP. We assume
that the n-th user Sn is selected to compute the task, which contains L bits and the offloading
ratio is ρ ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, the (1− ρ) part of the task is computed locally, while the rest
1When the local CPU frequency follows some other kinds of distribution, such as normal distribution or exponential distribution,
the results in this work will be changed accordingly, whereas the analysis method in this work can be easily extended.
2Rayleigh fading model is suitable for wireless communications in urban and indoor areas, where the prorogation of radio
signals are usually scattered by buildings and no light-of-sight wireless channels is available. Thus, flat Rayleigh fading
environment has been widely studied in the literature such as the works in [18], [19], [23]. The results in this work can
be easily extended to other fading model, such as Nakagami-m fading.
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ρ part is computed by the CAP.
If the task is completely computed locally with ρ = 0, the local latency T0 and energy









where η is the number of CPU cycles required by one bit of the computational task, and P0 is
the locally computational power.
When the task offloading occurs with ρ > 0, the data is transmitted through the wireless link
from Sn to the CAP. Let hn ∼ CN (0, α) and hen,m ∼ CN (0, β) denote the instantaneous channel
parameters from Sn to the CAP and eavesdropper Em, respectively. When the eavesdroppers


















where WB is the wireless bandwidth, PS is the transmit power at users, σ2 is the variance
of the additional white Gaussian noise (AWGN) and residual interference at the receiver, and
|hen|2 = max1≤n≤N |hen,m|2 is the largest channel gain of the eavesdropping links. In practice,
Cn,s is varying and it is difficult for the system to transmit at the secrecy data rate of Cn,s.
Accordingly, the communication system turns to transmit at a given secrecy data rate Ct, which is
easily implemented in practice. In this case, the transmission latency TS and energy consumption
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where gc is the CPU-cycle frequency of the CAP. By summarizing the above latency and energy
consumption, and incorporating the offloading ratio ρ, we can obtain the system latency tn,A and
energy consumption En,A associated with user Sn as
tn,A = max [(1− ρ)T0, ρTS + ρTC ] , (8)
En,A = (1− ρ)E0 + ρES + ρEC , (9)
where the max operation is used in (8), since the local computing and the offloading of confiden-
tial data as well as the edge computing can be executed in parallel. Hence, the system latency is
the maximum value between the latency of local computing and the latency of offloading as well
as the edge computing. In contrast, to fulfill the computational task, the procedures including
local computing, offloading and edge computing consume energy. Hence, the sum operation is
used in the calculation of energy consumption in (9).
III. SOP MINIMIZATION PROBLEM AND USER SELECTION CRITERIA
In the traditional physical-layer security theory, the outage probability is defined as the
probability that the instantaneous secrecy data rate Cn,s falls below the target secrecy data rate
Ct. In the secure MEC networks, except from the secrecy data rate, the constraints from the
latency and energy consumption should be also taken into account in the minimization problem
of the secrecy outage probability. In particular, the latency is important for the real-time control
systems, while the energy consumption is of vital importance for the limited-battery scenarios.
By jointly taking into account the impact from the latency and energy consumption, we aim
to minimize the secrecy outage probability for the secure MEC networks under the constraints
from the latency and energy consumption, which can be formulated as
min
ρ
Pn,out = Pr(Cn,s < Ct), (10a)
s.t. tn,A ≤ γT , (10b)
En,A ≤ γE, (10c)
where γT and γE are the thresholds of the latency and energy consumption, respectively. We
can observe from (10) that the system secrecy outage event occurs when the secrecy data rate
Cn,s is below the target secrecy data rate Ct, and the setting of the offloading ratio should meet
the requirements from the latency and energy consumption.
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In further, we propose several user selection criteria to choose one best user Sn∗ among N
ones, in order to enhance the system SOP performance, through exploiting the computational
and communication resources. In the following, we present three selection criteria based on the
computational capability, the instantaneous CSI of both main and eavesdropping links, and the
instantaneous CSI of main link only, respectively.
A. Criterion I
In this criterion, we choose the best user Sn∗ which has the most powerful computational
capacity, given by
n∗ = arg max
1≤n≤N
gn, (10)
which leads to the largest CPU-cycle frequency of users. To implement this criterion, the CAP
can firstly collect the CPU-cycle frequencies of N users, and then perform the user selection.
After that, the selection result is notified to the users through some dedicated feedback links.
B. Criterion II
If the instantaneous CSI of both the main and eavesdropping links is known, we can select
the best user Sn∗ through maximizing the secrecy data rate Cn,s,











To implement this criterion, the CAP and eavesdroppers can firstly estimate the channel param-
eters of the links to the users, through the help of some pilot signals from the users. Then, the
CAP can gather the required channel information and perform the user selection. If only a part
of eavesdroppers are willing to feedback the channel information, i.e., the instantaneous channel
information from only a part of eavesdroppers is known, criterion II will change from (11) to











where Ω denotes the set of eavesdroppers whose instantaneous channel information is known.
If none of the eavesdroppers is willing to feedback the channel information, the following
criterion III will be used instead.
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C. Criterion III
If the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropping links is hard to obtain, we can perform the user
selection through maximizing the data rate of the main links,
n∗ = arg max
1≤n≤N
|hn|2, (13)
which leads to the largest received signal-to-noise-plus-interference ratio (SINR) at the CAP.
To implement this criterion, the CAP can firstly estimate the channel parameters of the links
with users, aided by the pilot signals from the users. Then, the CAP can gather these channel
information and perform the user selection. In particular, criterion III can be regarded as a
degenerated version of criterion II with statistical channel information of eavesdropping links 3.
Overall, the above three user selection criteria provide a flexible choice for the system design of
the considered secure MEC networks. Specifically, if the system is sensitive to the computational
capability, criterion I tends to be used to achieve the fastest CPU-cycle frequency. On the other
hand, if the system is sensitive to the wireless channels, criterion II and III can be used to choose
the best user. In particular, criterion II should be used to implement the user selection if the
instantaneous channel information of eavesdropping links is known. If the instantaneous channel
information of eavesdropping links is unknown, i.e., only the statistical channel information of
eavesdropping links is known or even no channel information of eavesdropping links is known,
we should turn to use criterion I or III to perform the user selection. In particular, criterion III
can be regarded as a degenerated version of criterion II with statistical channel information of
eavesdropping links. In a word, we can flexibly choose one user selection criterion according to
the specific requirement on the computation and communication.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this part, we investigate the system secrecy performance by providing analytical and
analytical expressions for the SOP, under the constraints of both latency and energy consumption.












, where the operation E{}̇ denotes the statistical average. When the users form a cluster












will degenerate into n∗ = argmax1≤n≤N |hn|2.
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For the selected user Sn∗ , from (8), we can know that the latency constraint tn∗,A ≤ γT is
equivalent to  ρ ≥ ρ
∗
1,











− E0 − γE
PSρ
. (16)
By applying the constraint transformation in (14) and (16), we can re-write Pout as















Through the relationship of TS = LCt and TS ≤ d(gn∗), we can further write Pout as















where FCn∗,s(x) is the CDF of the secrecy data rate
4, and fgn∗ (v) is the PDF of the computational
capability of user Sn∗ .
A. Analysis on the offloading ratio
From (20), we can find that the system SOP improves with the increased value of d(v). Hence,
we can obtain the optimal offloading ratio ρ∗ in the following proposition,
4The subsequent analysis of this paper considers the Rayleigh fading. If some other kinds of channel fading are used such as
Nakagami-m fading, we can easily obtain the analytical results, through replacing the CDF of (20) by the CDF under the other
channel fading models.
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1, If ρ∗2 > 1
ρ∗2, If ρ
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E0 − γE + PSγT
E0 − EC + PSTC
. (22)
Proof: See Appendix A.






, If PS > γP
ψ1(gn∗), If PC ≤ PS ≤ γP
ψ2(gn∗), If PS < min(PC , γP ), gn∗ ≥ γf




γTP0Lη − γT (EC − PSTC)gn∗
P0Lη − (γE − PSγT )gn∗




− TC , (25)
γf =







From Proposition 1, we can see that the optimization of the offloading ratio needs to know
the local information on the CPU-cycle frequency of the selected user Sn∗ . In addition, we can
obtain the following insights on the system,
• When the transmit power is large with PS > γP , the system SOP is irrelative to the
latency threshold γT , and it only depends on the energy consumption threshold γE . This
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is because that the transmission latency becomes negligible and the energy consumption
becomes dominant in the outage event.
• When the transmit power is small with PS ≤ γP , both the latency threshold γT and energy
consumption threshold γE will affect the system SOP, as the transmission latency cannot
be ignored when the transmit power is not high.
• As d∗(gn∗) is a decreasing function with respect to L, an increased size of the computational
task will deteriorate the secrecy outage probability.
From the maximum value of d∗(gn∗) in (23), we can write the system SOP of the considered









In the following, we will derive the analytical and asymptotic expressions of SOP for the three
user selection criteria.
B. Secure Outage Probability of Criterion I
1) Analytical secrecy outage probability of criterion I: To compute the analytical SOP for
criterion I, we need to firstly calculate the CDF of Cn∗,s, which is given by the following theorem,





















Proof: See Appendix B.
Then, we turn to compute the PDF of gn∗ . Note that the RV gn follows the uniform distribution,





, If v ∈ [gmin, gmax]
0, Else
. (30)





, If v ∈ [gmin, gmax]
0, Else
. (31)
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(v − gmin)N−1dv. (32)
As it is difficult to directly solve the above integral, we turn to use the widely used Gaussian-








































































Note that the Gaussian-Chebyshev approximation in (34) can provide an exact result with an
infinite value of K, which has been pointed out by the literature such as the work in [35]. By
setting K to a relatively large number, (34) can provide a highly accurate approximation of SOP
for criterion I.
As d∗(gn∗) in (23) has several forms, we can further specify the analytical form of Pout,I by
applying (23) into (33) through using the relationship of PS and γP . In this way, we can obtain
the analytical form of SOP of criterion I for the considered MEC networks, which consists of
elementary functions only and hence is readily to be evaluated.
2) Asymptotic secrecy outage probability of criterion I: In order to obtain some insights on
the system, we now extend to provide the asymptotic expression of SOP of criterion I, where the
SINR PS/σ2 is high and the MER λ = αβ is large. By using the approximations of e
x ' 1 + x
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From the asymptotic FCn∗,s,I(x), we can obtain the asymptotic expression of Pout,I in the
following theorem,










(γE−EC )WB , If PS > γP
ΨN(gmin, gmax, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4), If PC ≤ PS ≤ γP









L(γE − PSγT )
WB
, (41)








ξ7 = (γT − TC)Lη, ξ8 = TCγT , (44)
and ΨN(g1, g2, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) is
ΨN(g1, g2, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) =
N2
− θ2
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Proof: See Appendix C.
From the asymptotic SOP in Theorem 2, we can obtain some insights on the system, as
follows,
• The secrecy diversity order of criterion I is unity. This is because that criterion I only
exploits the randomness of computational capability, yet fails to exploit the randomness of
transmission channels.
• The asymptotic Pout,I improves with an increasing N , as more users can provide a more
powerful computational capability at users.
• The asymptotic Pout,I deteriorates with an increasing M and L, as more eavesdroppers or
tasks lead to a more severe secure transmission burden.
C. Secure Outage Probability of Criterion II
1) Analytical secrecy outage probability of criterion II: To obtain the analytical SOP of
criterion II for the considered MEC networks, we need to firstly obtain the CDF of Cn∗,s, which
is given by the following theorem,























Proof: See Appendix C.
By applying the result of Theorem 3 into (28), we can obtain the analytical secrecy outage
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where the Gaussian-Chebyshev approximation is used in the last approximation. Similarly, by
applying several cases of d∗(gn∗) shown in (23), we can further specify the analytical form of
Pout,II by taking into account the relationship of PS and γP . In this way, we can obtain the
analytical form of SOP of criterion II for the considered MEC networks, which is composed of
elementary functions only and hence is easily to be calculated.
2) Asymptotic secrecy outage probability of criterion II: We further provide the asymptotic
expression of secrecy outage probability for criterion II, in the high regime of SINR and MER.
By using the approximations of ex ' 1+x and (1+x)−1 ' 1−x [34], we can firstly approximate







Then, by applying the asymptotic FCn∗,s(x) into (28), we can obtain the asymptotic secure outage










(γE−EC )WB , If PS > γP
Ψ1(gmin, gmax, Nξ1, Nξ2, ξ3, ξ4), If PC ≤ PS ≤ γP
Ψ1(gmin, γf , Nξ1, Nξ2, ξ3, ξ4) + Ψ1(γf , gmax, Nξ5, Nξ6, ξ7, ξ8), If PS < min(PC , γP )
.
(53)
From this asymptotic SOP, we can obtain some insights on the system for criterion II as,
• The system secrecy diversity order of criterion II is N , as criterion II exploits the channel
diversity of N branches. Accordingly, the system performance can be rapidly enhanced by
increasing the number of users.
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• The secrecy performance of criterion II deteriorates with a larger M and L, as the trans-
mission latency and energy consumption increase when there are more eavesdroppers and
tasks.
D. Secure Outage Probability of Criterion III
1) Analytical secrecy outage probability of criterion III: For criterion III, the associated CDF
of Cn∗,s is given by the following theorem,

























Proof: See Appendix D.
By applying the result of Theorem 4 into (28), we can obtain the analytical secrecy outage


























































where the Gaussian-Chebyshev approximation is employed in the last approximation. In a similar
way, by applying several cases of d∗(gn∗) shown in (23), we can further specify the analytical
form of Pout,III by taking into account the relationship between PS and γP . In this way, we
can obtain the analytical form of SOP of criterion III for the considered MEC networks, which
consists of elementary functions only and hence is easily to be computed.
2) Asymptotic secrecy outage probability of criterion III: To obtain some insights on the
system, we further derive the asymptotic expression of SOP of criterion III for the considered
secure MEC networks, in the high region of SINR and MER. Firstly, by using the approximations

























By applying the asymptotic FCn∗,s,III(x) into (28), we can obtain the asymptotic secure outage





From this asymptotic SOP, we can obtain some insights on the system for criterion III as,
• The secrecy diversity order of criterion III is also equal to N , as criterion III fully exploits
the N branches of main links. Accordingly, the system performance can be also rapidly
enhanced by increasing the number of users.
• As φN1 ≤ φ2 holds, we can find that criterion III is poorer than criterion II, since it cannot
exploit the eavesdropping links to perform the user selection.
• The secrecy performance of criterion III becomes worse with an increasing M and L, as
more eavesdroppers or tasks lead to an increased transmission latency and energy consump-
tion.
V. SIMULATIONS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical and simulation results to verify the proposed
studies. Without loss of generality, we set PS = 3W, P0 = 1W and PC = 0.2W. If not specified,
the task length L is 80 Mbits and the bandwidth of wireless transmission is 100MHz. The
channels in the network follow Rayleigh flat fading, where the average channel gain of the main
links is set to unity. Moreover, the local CPU-cycle frequency is uniformly distributed in the
range of [0.1, 1]GHz, while the CPU-cycle frequency at the CAP is set to 10GHz. The number
of required CPU-cycles for each bit is 10. In further, we set the outage thresholds of latency
and energy consumption to γT = 0.3 s and γE = 0.8 J, respectively5.
Fig. 2 shows the impact of the parameter K on the secrecy outage probability of the three
selection criteria, where N = M = 3, SINR is 35dB, MER is 20dB and K varies from 1 to 100.
5Similar parameter settings for the MEC networks can be found in the literature, such as the works in [6], [15], [23], where
the CAPs are of significantly powerful computational capacity, yet the local CPU-cycle frequency is randomly distributed and
smaller than that of CAPs.
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Fig. 2. Impact of parameter K on the secrecy outage probability of the three criteria.













































Fig. 3. Secure outage probability versus transmit SINR: Criterion I.
From Fig. 2, we can see that for each criterion, the Gaussian-Chebyshev approximation becomes
more accurate with the increased value of K. Moreover, the approximation becomes convergent
with a medium value of K, which validates our analysis. By taking into account the tradeoff
between the complexity and accuracy, we set the value of K to around 10 in the simulations.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the analytical and simulated secrecy outage probabilities of criterion
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I versus the transmit SINR, where MER is set to 20dB and different numbers of users and
eavesdroppers are investigated. For comparison, we also plot the results of the local com-








, corresponding to the proposed criteria, local computing and fully offload-
ing, respectively. As observed from Fig. 3, we can find that the analytical result of criterion I fits
well with the simulated one for various values of SINR, which validates the effectiveness of the
derived analytical SOP expression for criterion I. Moreover, the system secrecy performance of
criterion I improves with a larger value of SINR, due to the increased secrecy data rate. However,
in the high regime of SINR, there exhibits an error floor in the secrecy outage probability
indicating that the improvement is saturated, as the fixed MER has become the bottleneck of
the system performance. In further, the secrecy outage probability improves with a larger N , as
more users can provide more computational resources for criterion I. In contrast, the secrecy
outage probability of criterion I deteriorates with a larger M , as more eavesdroppers weaken
the secrecy transmission quality and hence lead to an increased transmission latency and energy
consumption. Furthermore, criterion I outperforms the local computing and fully offloading, as
it can jointly utilize the computational resources at both users and CAP. In particular, the secrecy
outage probability of local computing is quite poor and remains about unity even in high SINR
region, as the computational capability at the users is limited in practice and unable to fulfill
the computational task solely. Hence, γT ≤ T0 and γE ≤ E0 hold, and the system requirements
on the latency and energy consumption cannot be met in the local computing.
Fig. 4 illustrates the analytical and simulated secrecy outage probabilities of criterion II versus
the transmit SINR, where MER is 20dB, M ∈ {1, 3} and N ∈ {1, 3}. As observed from Fig. 4,
we can find that the analytical result of criterion II matches well with the simulated one, which
validates the effectiveness of the derived analytical SOP expression for criterion II. Moreover,
the secrecy outage probability of criterion II improves with a larger N , as more users can provide
more communications resources for criterion II. In contrast, the secrecy outage probability of
criterion II deteriorates with a larger M , as more eavesdroppers decreases the system secrecy
data rate and hence cause an increased transmission latency and energy consumption. In further,
criterion II outperforms both the local computing and fully offloading, as it can jointly use
the communication and computational resources at users and CAP, which further verifies the
effectiveness of criterion II.
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Fig. 4. Secure outage probability versus transmit SINR: Criterion II.








































Fig. 5. Secure outage probability versus transmit SINR: Criterion III.
Fig. 5 shows the analytical and simulated secrecy outage probabilities of criterion III versus
the transmit SINR, where MER is 20dB, M ∈ {1, 3} and N ∈ {1, 3}. We can find from Fig.
5 that the analytical result of criterion III is in good match with the simulated one, which
validates the effectiveness of the derived analytical SOP expressions for criterion III. Moreover,
August 17, 2021 DRAFT
23































Fig. 6. Effect of MER λ on the secrecy outage probability: Criterion I.
the secrecy outage probability of criterion III improves with a larger N , as more users can
provide more communications resources. In contrast, the secrecy outage probability of criterion
III deteriorates with a larger M , as more eavesdroppers are harmful to the system secrecy data
rate and hence result in an increased transmission latency and energy consumption. In further,
criterion III outperforms both the local computing and fully offloading, as it can jointly exploit
the communication and computational resources at users and CAP, which further verifies the
effectiveness of criterion III. Furthermore, by comparing the results in Figs. 3-5, we can find
that the secrecy performances of criterion II and III improve much more profoundly with a larger
N than that of criterion I, as criterion I fails to exploit the channel randomness of N branches.
In particular, criterion II outperforms criterion III, as the former can suppress the wiretap more
effectively by exploiting the eavesdropping information in the user selection.
Figs. 6-8 depict the effect of MER on the secrecy outage probabilities of the three criteria,
where M = 3, SINR=35dB and the number of users varies from 1 to 3. Specifically, Fig. 6, 7
and 8 correspond to criterion I, II and III, respectively. We can observe from these three figures
that for each criterion, the analytical SOP fits well with the simulated one, and the asymptotic
result becomes convergent to the exact value in the high regime of MER, which verifies the
effectiveness of the derived analytical and asymptotic SOP expressions of the three criteria.
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Fig. 7. Effect of MER λ on the secrecy outage probability: Criterion II.

































Fig. 8. Effect of MER λ on the secrecy outage probability: Criterion III.
Moreover, the SOP curves with different values of N are in parallel in Fig. 6, indicating that
the system secrecy diversity order of criterion I remains unchanged with the number of users. In
contrast, the SOP curves of criterion II and III are proportional to the number of users in Figs.
7 and 8, indicating that criteria II and III can achieve the system full secrecy diversity order
of N . In further, by comparing the results in Figs. 7-8, we can find that criterion III is worse
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Fig. 9. Secure outage probability versus the number of users N .
than criterion II, since it cannot exploit the eavesdropping information in the process of user
selection.
Fig. 9 shows the secrecy outage probabilities of the three criteria versus the number of users
and bits, where SINR is 35dB, MER is 20dB, L = 80Mbits and N varies from 1 to 5. We can
observe from Fig. 9 that for various values of N , the analytical SOP of each criterion is in good
match with the simulated one, which further verifies the effectiveness of the derived analytical
SOP expressions of the three criteria. Moreover, the SOP performance of each criterion improves
with an increased N , as more users provide more communication and computational resources for
the system. In particular, the SOP improvement of criterion I from more users is quite marginal,
as it exploits the information of CPU-cycle frequency only in the user selection. In contrast, the
performances of criterion II and III are enhanced rapidly, and they are not convergent with the
increased number of users, as these two criteria employ the dynamic channel information of N
branches in the user selection. We can further find that criterion II outperforms criterion III, as
it can exploit the channel information of eavesdropping links in the user selection.
Fig. 10 demonstrates the secrecy outage probabilities of the three criteria versus the number
of bits, where SINR is 35dB, MER is 20dB, N = 3 and L varies from 50Mbits to 100Mbits. We
can observe from Fig. 10 that for various values of L, the analytical SOP of each criterion fits
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Fig. 10. Secure outage probability versus the task length L.
well with the simulated one, which further verifies the effectiveness of the derived analytical SOP
expressions of the three criteria. Moreover, the SOP performance of each criterion deteriorates
with an increased L, due to the heavier burden on the communication and computation. In
further, we can see that criterion III is outperformed by criterion III, as it fails to exploit the
channel information of eavesdropping links in the process of user selection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the secure MEC network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers,
where the offloading from the users to the CAP could be overheard by the eavesdroppers,
which caused the severe issue of information leakage. To address this issue, we firstly presented
the SOP minimization problem, by jointly taking into account the constraints from the latency
and energy consumption. We then presented three user selection criteria to enhance the system
secrecy performance, based on the locally computational capacity, the secrecy capacity and
data rate of main links, respectively. For these three criteria, we further analyzed the system
secrecy performance by deriving the analytical and asymptotic expressions of SOP, from which
we obtained some important insights on the system design. Simulation and analytical results
were finally provided to verify the proposed studies on the secure MEC network. In particular,
the three criteria can efficiently safeguard the MEC networks, compared to the traditional local
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computing and fully offloading, especially with a large value of user number.
In future works, we will investigate the considered MEC networks in a multi-cell commu-
nication scenario, where the interference may not be modeled by the Gaussian distribution. In
addition, we will extend the considered MEC networks from the Rayleigh fading to some other
kinds of channels, such as Nakagami-m fading.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
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From these two derivatives, we can find that γT
ρ




E0 − EC − E0−γEρ
)
increases. Then, by setting γT
ρ
− TC equal to 1PS
(
E0 − EC − E0−γEρ
)
,
we can obtain one critical value of ρ as
ρ = ρ∗2 =
E0 − γE + PSγT
E0 − EC + PSTC
. (A.3)
From (A.3), we can find that γT
ρ
− TC is larger than 1PS
(
E0 − EC − E0−γEρ
)
when ρ < ρ∗2 and
vice versa. Therefore, when ρ ∈ (ρ∗1, 1) holds, the maximum value of d(gn∗) can be obtained by
setting ρ = ρ∗2. When ρ
∗
2 > 1 holds, which is equivalent to PS ≥
γE−EC
γT−TC
, the maximum value
of d(gn∗) can be obtained by setting ρ = 1. Similarly, when ρ∗2 ≤ ρ∗1 holds, the maximum value
of d(gn∗) can be obtained by setting ρ = ρ∗1. To summarize, we can obtain the optimal value of
d(gn∗) with ρ = ρ∗ in (21). In this way, we have completed the proof of Proposition 1.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1






































































In this way, we have completed the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove Theorem 2, we firstly apply the results of (31) and (37) into (28), and detail the
asymptotic expression of Pout,I in the following three cases:
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where ΨN(g1, g2, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4) is given by






























By using the technique of partial integral, we can obtain the analytical form of ΨN(g1, g2, θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4),
as shown in (45), which leads to the asymptotic result of Pout,I .




















= ΨN(gmin, γf , ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4) + ΨN(γf , gmax, ξ5, ξ6, ξ7, ξ8). (C.10)
By summarizing the above three cases, we obtain the asymptotic expression of Pout,I , as shown
in (39), which has completed the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In criterion II, the instantaneous CSI of both eavesdropping and main links are known, and



















|hn|2 ≤ 2x(1 + PS/σ2 max1≤m≤M |hn,m|2)− 1
PS/σ2
N , (D.2)
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where we use the property that the channels of N users are independent and identically dis-










By applying the PDFs of RVs |hn|2 and |hen|2 in (B.3) and (B.4), and then solving the required
integral, we can obtain the CDF of Rn∗,s for criterion II, as shown in (48). In this way, we have
completed the proof of Theorem 3.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In criterion III, the user selection relies on the channel parameters of main links only. In this









































Then, by substituting (B.4) and (E.4) into (E.3), and then solving the required integral, we can
obtain obtain the CDF of Cn∗,s for criterion III, as shown in (54). In this way, we have completed
the proof of Theorem 4.
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